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Abstract: When analyzing migration policies, second best redistribution be-
comes a local public good subject to congestion.The remedial policy consists of
a kind of second best finance for that good.
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Resumen: Cuando analizamos las políticas migratorias,la redistribución del in-
greso mediante impuestos indirectos se convierte en un bien público local suje-
to a congestión. La solución a este problema pasa por diseñar una financiación
adecuada para este bien público.
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Introduction
A
s surveyed in Borjas (2002), important US policy measures regard-
ing immigration have been inspired by the concerns that migrants
can become public charges, as well as to avoid the US public welfare to
become an immigration magnet (consider, for instance, the 1891 US
Congress legislation concerning entry of persons likely to become public
charges, or even the 1994 Proposition 187 in California).
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In a more theoretical framework,Wildasin (1994) shows how income
redistribution policies by a host country distort migration decisions,and
may make all inhabitants of the host country worse off when freeing
migration.(See Myers and Papageorgiou, 2000;Razin and Sadka,1995;
Wellisch and Wildasin,1996;Wellisch and Walz 1998;and also Wildasin,
1998; for related topics.) Also, Brecher and Choudhri (1990) discuss the
problems of using a redistribution mechanism based on indirect taxa-
tion (as the mechanism that Dixit and Norman, 1980, use for proving
gains from trade)
1 in order to attain a Pareto gain from freeing factor
markets.These two papers take a host country point of view.
In this paper we analyze the policies needed in order to achieve Pareto
gains from freeing international migration, when countries are using
income redistribution policies.In order to achieve a deeper understand-
ing of the problems, and also consider the origin country point of view,
I base my presentation in the discussion of a very simple model.
The basic intuition of the negative results in Brecher and Choudhri
(1990) and Wildasin (1994) is that subsidies can attract more migrants
than is efficient. These additional migrants represent a cost for the fis-
cal system. The per-head cost of redistribution increases whenever the
proportion of those receiving net subsidies increases. For certain levels
and types of migration, the increase in the per-head cost of making the
redistribution,and the distortion in the allocation of workers in the world,
can make it impossible to obtain Pareto gains from freeing migration.
I will show that, in addition, migration not only may increase the fiscal
cost of redistribution in the host country,but also may increase that cost
in the origin country.
Here, income redistribution is a kind of local public good subject
to congestion. Hammond and Sempere (2006) analyzed the gains from
migration in economies with local public goods subject to congestion.
The variation in the demographic composition could change the average
cost of provision of those goods. Then, free migration could result
in changes in costs of provision of the local public goods (or reductions
in the quality of these) exceeding the efficiency gains from migration.
The solution proposed was to introduce residence charges that were
1 Dixit and Norman show that, when freeing trade, freezing wages and other prices
(using indirect taxation) at status quo levels make it possible to obtain a positive net fiscal
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function of the congestion characteristics
2 and the migration plan
3 of each
individual.
In the model that I present here,these residence charges would actu-
ally operate as Pigou taxes on migration;i.e.as devices to make migrants
internalize the higher cost of redistribution caused by their presence in
the host country and their absence in the origin country.With these tax-
es, migrants bear the cost of the fiscal externality caused on the origin
and host countries by the marginal migrant.I show that the internaliza-
tion of the fiscal externality by migrants is enough to make Pareto gains
from freeing migration feasible again.Therefore,these type of taxes could
be the appropriate remedy for the problems analyzed in Brecher and
Choudhri (1990) and Wildasin (1994).
We finally extend the model to consider cases in which governments
cannot use the first best Pigouvian scheme, and thus have to tax all
migrants at the same rate. If those taxes make migrants bear the aver-
age fiscal redistributive cost caused by the average marginal migrant,
achieving Pareto gains from free migration is feasible, despite the dis-
tortion caused in the allocation of workers among countries.The only in-
formation required for obtaining a Pareto gain is aggregate information
regarding prices, wages and profits, and also whether a person is a mi-
grant or not.
The paper is organized as follows: Section I presents a model where
Pareto gains from freeing migration are possible with lump sum redis-
tribution. Section II shows the impossibility of obtaining Pareto gains
from free migration in the same example, when Dixit-Norman redistri-
bution is used.Section III shows how a system of Pigouvian taxes on mi-
gration can make,together with the Dixit-Norman scheme,Pareto gains
from freeing migration feasible again. Section IV analyzes the same is-
sue, but with more than one type of migrant, when non-discriminatory
taxation of migrants has to be used. Section V concludes the paper with
some final remarks.
2 Congestion characteristics are those relevant for the determination of the needs for con-
suming certain public goods. Thus, they determine the consumption (and so the level of
congestion induced) of those goods.
3 Migration plans are vectors that specify where individuals plan to reside in different
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I. A simple model with Pareto gains from migration 
with lump sum transfers
Given that we focus our discussion on the problems in using the Dixit-
Norman compensatory mechanism,we present a simple model (based on
Wildasin, 1994) in which, as trivial efficiency gains from freeing migra-
tion will appear,the only issue is the redistribution of the efficiency gains
from migration.
Assume that there are two regions, 1 and 2. Let 1 be the normalized
world population of mobile workers.The proportion of the world popula-
tion of mobile workers living in each region in the allocation without mi-
gration (referred to from now on as the status quo) is P 1 and P 2,respectively.
We assume that each worker supplies inelastically a unit of labor.We as-
sume that P 1 < P 2 so region 2 is more populated than 1 in the status quo.
We also assume the absence of any kind of migration costs.
4
There is a single firm in each region producing a homogeneous com-
modity using labor as the only input.We assume that both regions share
the same technology. For simplicity, we assume that each regional firm
is owned by the status quo set of workers in its region, but they cannot
physically transport their part of the firm with them if they migrate.
However, they would receive their share of the profits (net of taxes)
wherever they live. We also assume that the number of shares in a re-
gional firm owned by each worker is not the same for all its owners.
5
We assume that the only source of non-labor income is distributed prof-
its.This implies that the income distribution in the status quo coincides
with the distribution of shares of the firms.
6
We assume that the technology is represented by the production func-
tion f(l)=2l
1 –
2.Where l is the proportion of the world population working
in the corresponding region once migration is liberalized.
7
4This would imply that all migration is unregulated (and therefore legal).Illegal migra-
tion would have an implicit cost.
5Assuming that all status quo workers in each region own the same number of shares of
the regional firm would eliminate the problem of redistribution within regions.
6 We leave this income distribution unspecified. Specifying a given income distribution
would have allowed to compute exact gains and losses for each individual. However,
this would have been at the cost of a more complicated notation,without adding more insight
to the results.
7 More general production functions would give the same qualitative results, as far as
they present decreasing returns to labor.This simple formulation is used in order to obtain
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We assume perfect competition,so that wages equal marginal produc-
tivity of labor.Our assumption on the population sizes in the status quo
implies that 
(1)
Thus,if we free migration,region 1 will receive an inflow of immigrants
from region 2. This inflow will stop when wages are equalized between
regions.Given the structure of our model,this inflow will stop when both re-
gions have the same number of workers. Thus (P2 − P1) / 2 workers will
migrate from region 2 to region 1. The new equilibrium is an efficient
allocation in which marginal productivity of labor is equalized among
regions.
Increasing the size of the labor force will decrease wages in region 1.
The decrease in wages in region 1 is 
(2)
That is, the difference between status quo wages and market wages
with free migration.
However, profits will increase in the amount 
(3)
where the sum of the left hand side of the inequality represents prof-
its (production less wages paid) with free migration, and the sum of the
right hand side terms represents profits in the status quo.
This could be rewritten as 
(4)
So,given that                                ,profits are larger with free migration
than in the status quo.
It can be shown that the aggregate gains in profits are larger than
the aggregate losses in wages  P 1 (w –
1 − w1)  for the status quo workers in54 Sempere: Redistribution as a Local Public Good Subject to Congestion
region 1. There would be a Pareto gain in region 1 if all its status quo
workers owned the same share of the firm. However, if they own differ-
ent proportions of the firm, and we look for a Pareto gain, a system of
lump sum transfers would be required to redistribute the gains from
migration. This system must tax workers with larger shares in the
regional firm,and subsidize workers with no shares or few enough shares,
as the increase in their dividends is not enough to compensate the
decrease in their wage income.
In region 2 the situation would be opposite,as aggregate wages would
increase and aggregate profits decrease.By symmetry with the situation
in region 1, the wage increase would not be enough to compensate the
decrease in profits. However, it is easy to show that the net aggregate
gains in region 1 are large enough to compensate the net aggregate loss-
es in region 2.The intuition is that the free migration equilibrium is first
best optimal and, without any distortion, the Pareto frontier with free
migration must dominate the Pareto frontier without free migration.
Achieving the Pareto gain would require knowledge of the shares of
the firms owned by each worker.Feasibility of the lump sum transfer sys-
tem would also require interregional transfers from region 1 to region 2.
These transfers can take two forms.The first is pure intergovernmental
transfers that make feasible the compensation of losers in region 2 by
the government in that region.The second is the possibility that region
2 can tax all its status quo inhabitants,independently of where they are
working in the new equilibrium.This could make region 2 gain from free-
ing migration, by sharing with all its actual inhabitants the gains in
wages obtained by its migrants.
II. Equilibrium with Dixit-Norman compensation
This section analyzes the possibility of using a redistribution mechanism
based on taxes on prices and on profits, in order to obtain a Pareto gain
from freeing migration.That is,following Dixit and Norman (1980,1986),
we analyze the feasibility of using the tax system to freeze wages and
profits at status quo levels, and obtain a positive net fiscal revenue in
the free migration economy.Given that all consumers would face the same
budget constraint as in the status quo, none is worse off. The existence
of a positive fiscal revenue out of this policy makes possible that,through
the appropriate redistribution of the fiscal revenue,some consumers are
made better off and a Pareto gain is achieved.Clearly,this redistribution
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mechanism is informationally less demanding than the mechanism
sketched in the last section, because it uses only aggregate information
about the economy, instead of individual information about individual
ownership.
We now assume that the government in region 1 subsidizes free mi-
gration wages received by workers, so that wages remain as in the sta-
tus quo. Assume, to start with, that government 2 does not do so. Then
the equilibrium migration condition is 
(5)
The equilibrium level of migration is in this case n = P 2 − P 1.It is twice
the first best level of migration.The population living and working in re-
gion 1 is  P 1  + n = P 2.The difference between this and the first best level
of migration is the migration fiscally induced by the redistributive poli-
cy.The total subsidy in wages amounts to 
(6)
That is, the unit subsidy in wages times the workers receiving it.The
increase in aggregate profits due to migration (that could be taxed away
and used to subsidize wages) is 
(7)
where the sum of the first two terms are profits (production less wages
paid) in the free migration equilibrium, and the sum of the last two are
profits in the status quo. Notice that the firm in region 1 is paying the
market wage (when there are P 2 workers),whereas workers receive sub-
sidized wages.The previous expression can be rewritten as 
(8)
Thus the net revenue of the public sector is 
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It is straightforward to show that it is negative. The subsidy in wages
grows more than the increase in profits because of the fiscally induced
migration.This makes unfeasible the use of the Dixit-Norman compen-
satory mechanism.This coincides with the results obtained in Wildasin
(1994) (in fact,this is a particular case of Wildasin’s model) and with the
results of Brecher and Choudhri (1990) for a small country.With a simi-
lar argument it could be shown that it is not feasible for region 2 to freeze
wages (and so obtain a positive revenue out of commodity taxation, as
market wages rise in that region) and profits (in this case, by using the
positive revenue in commodity taxation to subsidize the negative prof-
its) at status quo levels.
If both regions freeze wages at their status quo levels, the result is
even worse. Given that, independently of migration, the difference in
wages will persist (and given that there are no migration costs) all mo-
bile workers will try to move to region 1.All production will inefficient-
ly be made in region 1, and the production level in region 2 will equal
zero. With no other policy action, there is an impossibility of obtaining
Pareto gains from freeing migration with the redistribution mechanism
discussed in this section. In a more complex model, migration costs and
attachment to specific locations would set a bound to the migration flow.
However, unless migration costs are high enough to prevent any migra-
tion at all,the problems caused by fiscally induced migration would per-
sist.
III. A Pigou tax on the fiscal externality
As shown in the previous section, the second best redistribution of the
gains from migration is a local public good subject to congestion.Increasing
the proportion of the inhabitants receiving the subsidy increases the per-
head cost of provision.This increase is large enough to transform the ef-
ficiency gains from migration into fiscal losses.
The solution that we are going to analyze consists in charging a tax
on all actual workers in a given region,and paying back this tax to those
that were in that region in the status quo (to ensure feasibility of the sta-
tus quo allocation). Obviously, this would be equivalent to a system of
taxes on migrants, who are the ones that are not refunded their taxes.
Thus, in the remainder of the paper we will refer to them as migration
taxes.Those could be interpreted as the Pigouvian solution to the fiscal
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The taxes on migration that would correct for the fiscal externality in
region 1 are those that charge all migrants with the fiscal externality
caused by the marginal migrant.That is, the subsidy on the wage of the
marginal migrant, . To start with, we assume that
only country 1 sets corrective taxes.Then,the equilibrium migration con-
dition is 
(10)
Substitution of  t1 gives 
(11)
This implies that migrants to region 1 are financing the fiscal exter-
nality caused by them. However, there are still too many migrants with
respect to the optimal allocation.This is because the redistributive pol-
icy of region 2 is distorting the migration decision. Notice that the mi-
gration equilibrium condition means that regions are simply exchanging
population, but migrants are contributing to finance the compensatory
policies in region 1. In this inefficient allocation the fiscal cost of freez-
ing wages in region 1 is 
and the fiscal revenue from freezing profits is 
It is easy to show that the balance is positive.
In the absence of further policy measures, the government in region
2 obtains a positive revenue out of freezing wages 
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It is easy to show that the balance is negative.In our simple and sym-
metric model (and given that the compensatory policy implies that re-
gions only exchange populations) the fiscal surplus in region 1 just equals
the deficit of region 2.A system of interregional lump sum transfers would
make the status quo allocation feasible for both regions.However,strict
Pareto gains are not feasible in this case.
To achieve a strict Pareto gain, additional policy measures have to
be taken.The required policy has to compensate for the excessive migra-
tion that the redistributive policy in region 2 causes.This is equivalent
to a tax on migrants,charging them for the fiscal externality in region 2.
The tax amounts to the contribution to the tax on wages in region 2 by a
marginal non-migrant, . Then, the migration equi-
librium condition is 
or equivalently,
which implies an efficient distribution of population.
IV. The more than one type case
In the simple economy with just one type of worker of the previous sec-
tions, achieving an efficient allocation of population amounts to estab-
lishing a system of redistribution by nationality. We are indirectly
excluding migrants from the subsidy in wages in region 1, and making
them participate in the tax on wages in region 2.There are no problems
of incentive compatibility other than the possible illegal migration
(i.e.evasion of the tax on migrants) that could be induced,if taxes on mi-
grants in both regions are high enough.
In a more sophisticated model where the fiscal externality depends
on the type of migrant that we are considering, differential taxation of
migration would be needed to fully internalize the fiscal externality.The
contribution of this section is to analyze whether aggregate information
about wages and profits (necessary to implement the Dixit-Norman com-
pensatory mechanism), and information about who the migrants are, is
enough to achieve a Pareto gain from freeing migration.
(16)
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If the relevant characteristics are not easily observed, incentive con-
straints would exclude discriminatory taxation of migrants.Then migra-
tion decisions will be distorted, and different kind of inefficiencies will
appear.However,in the following example we will show that despite this
additional inefficiency, Pareto gains from freeing migration could be
achieved.
Consider now a slightly more complicated model, with two types of
mobile workers in each region. Let j (for j = a, b) be the superindex de-
noting the type,and Pi
j the proportion of workers of type j (for j = a,b) in
region i (for i = 1,2).We assume that P2
j  > P1
j,so region 2 has more work-
ers of each type than region 1. As before, this will determine the direc-
tion of migration flows. Assume also that each worker will supply
inelastically a unit of labor. The production function in region 2 will be
very similar to the one before,
so both labor types obtain the same wage.Assume instead that the pro-
duction function in region 1 has the form 
so labor of type a is twice as productive as labor of type b in region 1.This
could happen because of unmodelled differences in infrastructure be-
tween the two regions.I introduce this asymmetry between the regions’
technology,because this will imply a difference between labor types that
will result in a distortion in the allocation, if we treat both types equally.
The objective of this section is to show the possibility of Pareto gains,des-
pite the inefficiency introduced by this distortion.
In the status quo allocation, wages are larger in region 1 than in re-
gion 2 for both types of labor.If there is the possibility of free migration,
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for type a, and 
for type b.Solving these equations gives the equilibrium levels of migra-
tion for each type. As before, this is an efficient allocation, and Pareto
gains from freeing migration could be obtained if appropriate lump sum
transfers were available.
Assume now that government 1 wants to use a Dixit-Norman kind of
redistribution mechanism together with corrective migration taxes, as
those discussed in section 3,but cannot distinguish among the different
types of workers, so that it charges the same tax to all of them.Assume
also that,for simplicity,government  does not try to redistribute.Also as-
sume that the tax charges the fiscal externality caused by the average
marginal migrant, so
This, together with the migration equilibrium conditions 
and 
determines the new equilibrium.
It is easy to see that the presence of the same tax for both types of la-
bor induces too much migration of type b and too little of type a,with re-
spect to the efficient allocation. Therefore, the new allocation is not
efficient. However, notice that all migrants are financing the tax exter-
nality caused by them (and in average they are obtaining the wages they
would,without public intervention).Following straightforwardly the ar-
gument in section 3, in the new equilibrium all the status quo workers
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plus immigration taxes are at least enough to finance the necessary sub-
sidy in wages.This implies that the first region is obtaining a Pareto gain
from freeing migration.A similar argument as in section 3 could be used
to analyze the case of region 2.
V. Final remarks
We have presented a simple example in which Pareto gains from freeing
migration are possible, when governments can use lump sum taxation.
When this type of non-distortionary taxation is not feasible, a Dixit-
Norman compensatory mechanism based on taxing wages and dividends
could be used.However,without other policy measures,this type of mech-
anism distorts migration flows, and the distortion can be such that the
gains from migration turn out to be losses, because of the resulting in-
crease in the fiscal cost of implementing the compensatory policies.
Efficient allocation of workers among regions requires a kind of Pigou
taxes on migration that make migrants internalize the fiscal externali-
ties. This type of taxes is, in fact, equivalent to a system of nationality-
based Dixit-Norman compensatory mechanism. However, apart from
information about prices and profits, its feasibility requires the know-
ledge of the type of migrant.This could be infeasible in practice,because
of incentive constraints.
If governments cannot use migration taxes that discriminate for dif-
ferent types of migrants, the required policy consists of a single tax on
all migrants that makes migrants,on average,bear the cost of the fiscal
externality they cause.This does not lead to an efficient allocation of la-
bor among regions. However, Pareto gains from freeing migration flows
are possible in our example,if a Dixit-Norman compensatory mechanism,
complemented with this tax, is used to redistribute the aggregate effi-
ciency gains.
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